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DEFINING "MARKET" UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT:
CONSIDERATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY
I. INTRODUCTION
HE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES have been enacted to
protect and ensure competition and the efficient use of economic re-
sources.' In particular, section 7 of the Clayton Act 2 was enacted to pro-
tect against the "monopoly in its incipiency" represented by mergers
which have the actual or potential effect of substantially lessening com-
petition in a relevant product market.'
A merger challenge under section 7 of the Act requires a determina-
tion of the boundaries of the relevant product market in which the com-
petitive effect of the acquisition will be evaluated.' This product market
may range from one item to an entire industry, depending upon the
economic considerations used as a basis for the definition.'
Since the true competitive effect of a section 7 challenged acquisition
must be considered in order for the Clayton Act to prohibit a threat-
ened merger, the courts in these cases should engage in a dynamic
analysis of all available evidence of competitive effect. Different eco-
nomic considerations will be relevant in analyzing various acquisitions.
Some courts have refused to employ this dynamic approach and have
treated the definition of "market" as a question of law rather than fact.'
This approach to legal analysis is inadequate because too much reliance is
placed upon similarities to other reported cases and not enough atten-
tion is paid to the evidence of competitive effect in the record. As a
result the true effect on competition is obscured because the merger is
evaluated within an economically insignificant product area.
This article will discuss technological capacity, an economic considera-
tion to which some courts seem to give insubstantial consideration in
section 7 challenges.' If courts consistently evaluated evidence of tech-
1 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 279 (1966); Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
' United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
' Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See note 9 infra and accompanying
text.
' Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), with United
States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
' See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Company, Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1978). "A pronouncement as to market defini-
tion is not one of law, but of fact, and as such, a party in a private action may allo-
cate it to the jury." Id at 27.
' See United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1978); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
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nological capacity, section 7 could be more effective in prohibiting
mergers that have the effect of lessening competition in an economically
significant market.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROHIBITION OF A HORIZONTAL MERGER
Prohibitions against horizontal mergers concern activity which in-
creases productive concentration in relevant markets rather than the
overall economy.8 The standard of illegality employed by the courts to
determine the effect that an intended acquisition will have in the
market place is set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or ... the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such an acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'
The anticompetitive effect of a merger, according to the Act, must be
felt "in any line of commerce in any section of the country."'0 Therefore,
proof of a violation of the statute must include a definition of the rele-
vant product market ("line of commerce")" and geographic market ("sec-
tion of the country")." In United States v. Pabst Brewing Co." the
Supreme Court indicated that in a horizontal merger case, the geo-
graphic market requirement of section 7 was established if the plaintiff
proved that the merger may have had a substantial anticompetitive ef-
fect somewhere in the United States." "[The] phrase [section of the
country] does not call for the delineation of a 'section of the country' by
metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground."'
5
The product market requirement of section 7 is proved if the plaintiff
can show that the merger may lead to a lessening of competition in a
"market" composed of economically significant products.'" The boun-
daries of the class of products encompassing a relevant product market
' See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
1 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1976)) (emphasis added).
10 Id.
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
" United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
18 Id
, Id at 549.
'8 Id
18 United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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for purposes of determining the effect of a merger have not been con-
sistently defined in section 7 challenges to date."7
Brown Shoe v. United States,'8 the first merger case to be decided by
the Supreme Court after the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act,
19
defined the boundaries of a relevant product market in a manner which
continues to be recognized in many merger cases. Although Brown Shoe
was concerned with vertical integration,2" the product market definition
introduced in the opinion has been implemented in horizontal, as well as
vertical, merger litigation.'
[According to the manufacturer] the outer boundaries of a pro-
duct market are determined by the reasonable interchange-
ability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the pro-
duct itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad
market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in them-
selves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.
United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593-595. The boundaries of such a submarket may be deter-
mined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes and
specialized vendors.'
The limits of the relevant market in which a merger's effect is to be
evaluated are, according to Brown Shoe, to be determined by evaluating
," Compare United States v. Hughes Tool Company, 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), with United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
19 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 606 (1977). The 1950
amendment altered the section generally to prohibit the acquisition of the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation if the effect would be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
' "Vertical integration" refers generally to the combination of two or more
businesses on different levels of operation such as manufacturing, wholesaling, or
retailing the same product. "Horizontal integration" refers generally to the com-
bination of two or more businesses of the same type such as manufacturers of the
same types of products. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 946 (4th ed. 1968).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963);
United States v. Tracinda Investment Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979);
United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978); FTC
v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MERGER GUIDELINES § 3 (1968) (any product or service distinguishable from
others as a matter of normal commercial attitudes is treated as a separate
market even though other products or services would be adequate substitutes for
most uses).
'2 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (emphasis added).
1979]
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the degree of competition between various products.23 Since the
Supreme Court recognized distinctive submarkets noncompetitive with
each other within the broader market of shoes, the district court was
affirmed in its holding that the relevant lines of commerce in the case
were men's, women's, and children's shoes." "These product lines are
recognized by the public; each line is manufactured in separate plants;
each has characteristics peculiar to itself rendering it generally noncom-
petitive with the others; and each is, of course, directed toward a dis-
tinct class of customers.""
In a merger challenge under section 7, the court determines the effect
that the challenged acquisition will have on competition within a judi-
cially-constructed relevant market."' The effect that an acquisition will
have on competition within a relevant market will vary, of course,
depending upon the boundaries of the product market.27 For example,
the acquisition of a medium-sized producer of women's shoes by a large
and leading producer of men's shoes may be permitted under the Brown
Shoe submarket approach if the acquired company does not have a con-
centrated share of the women's shoe market and there is no evidence
that the men's shoe producer was a potential competitor in the women's
market. 8 If the definition of the relevant market included the shoe in-
dustry in total, however, the merger would likely be prohibited because
the expansion of a leading producer's line would have a substantial ef-
fect on competition within the shoe industry.'
Brown Shoe, therefore, in setting the outer limits of the product
market by the degree of substitutability and interchangeability of end
use, evaluated the challenged acquisition's effect on competition within
markets composed of men's, women's, and children's shoes.2" No con-
sideration was given to the competitive effect of the acquisition within a
product market composed of two or more of the designated lines of com-
merce." Since Brown Shoe was decided, some courts have become more
sophisticated in their development of a relevant product market defini-
tion and have interpreted the Brown Shoe criteria as benchmarks used
to recognize competition where it exists rather than limiting principles
" Id. at 326.
4 Id.
25 Id-
See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). See also notes 9-12 supra and
accompanying text.
27 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 607.
See, e.g., Crown Zellbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
n See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
o Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
"[T]o classify shoes as a whole could be unfair and unjust; to classify them
further would be impractical, unwarranted and unrealistic." Id. at 299.
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used to obscure the competitive effect of an acquisition.32 For example, in
United States v. Continental Can Co.," the Supreme Court evaluated the
effect of the challenged acquisition in a market composed of metal and
glass containers. "[Even) though interchangeability of use may not be so
complete and cross-elasticity of demand not so immediate as in the case
of some intra-industry mergers, the long-run results [of the acquisition]
bring the competition between them within § 7. The trial court record
in the Continental Can case contained evidence that Continental Can
was insulating itself from competition by acquiring a major firm that
was not presently directing its market acquisition efforts toward the
same end uses as Continental but possessed the potential to do so.'
Thus, the acquisition could, in the long run, substantially lessen competi-
tion and violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. 6
Continental Can goes beyond Brown Shoe in impressing upon federal
courts that the entire record must be closely examined to determine the
competitive effect of a challenged acquisition. The Brown Shoe criteria
"offer no precise formula for judgment and they necessitate, rather than
avoid, careful consideration based on the entire record."37 Some courts
have followed Continental Can and have evaluated the competitive ef-
fect of a challenged acquisition by defining the product market in a man-
ner which considers the structure, history, and future of the product
lines involved in addition to Brown Shoe's reasonable interchangeability
and cross-elasticity of demand criteria.3" Other courts, however, seem to
disregard evidence of competitive effect present in the record and make
their section 7 determination solely on the basis of the reasonable inter-
changeability and end use of the product." In doing so, they are engag-
ing in an incomplete analysis of the competitive effect of the challenged
I See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Beatrice
Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1 (1975).
378 U.S. 441 (1964).
"If an area of effective competition cuts across industry lines, the relevant
line of commerce must do likewise." I& at 442.
Id at 464.
It is not at all self-evident that the lack of current competition between
Continental and Hazel-Atlas for some important end uses of metal and
glass containers significantly diminished the adverse effect of the
merger on competition ... The acquisition of Hazel-Atlas by a company
engaged in such intense efforts to effect a diversion of business from
glass to metal in both of these lines cannot help but diminish the likeli-
hood of Hazel-Atlas realizing its potential as a significant competitor in
either market ... Thus, the fact that Continental and Hazel-Atlas were
not substantial competitors of each other for certain end uses at the
time of the merger may actually enhance the long-run tendency of the
merger to lessen competition.
Id at 464-65.
Id at 449.
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249
19791
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acquisition and perhaps permitting a merger which may provide a cor-
poration with the ability to substantially lessen competition at some
future point in time.0
Although a product market definition cannot be all-encompassing,"'
the definition should be sufficiently inclusive in order to be meaningful
in terms of trade realities.' This requires that a wide range of economi-
cally relevant considerations be taken into account in a section 7
challenge.'3 One economic consideration that is often given inadequate
attention in cases evaluating a product market based on reasonable
interchangeability and the end use of a product is the technological
capacity of either the production or distribution sectors of the merging
entities." This capacity can give the acquiring company the opportunity
to affect competition at some point in the future.'5 If there had been evi-
dence of an increase in technological capacity that threatened competi-
tion in the Brown Shoe merger, the Court may have considered the
reasonable interchangeability and end use of the resources involved in
constructing a product market definition. Since the evidence was not
present in the record, the Court restricted its determination of competi-
tive effect to submarkets composed of products that the record showed
were non-competitive with each other.'" Brown Shoe, therefore, cannot
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979); Beatrice
Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1 (1975).
1 United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
"0 The standard of proof to find a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act is
proof of a change in the structure of the product market from which an inference
can be drawn that competition is likely to be reduced substantially sometime in
the future. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
" Times-Picayne Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 (1953).
42 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961).
" The incipiency that Congress included [in § 7 of the Clayton Act]-a
merger is illegal if its effect may be substantially to lessen competition
-reflects a clear political judgment, a judgment to provide a strong
"tilt" against a merger in a close case. What Congress did was to provide
a flexible inquiry, using market concepts to determine the merger's im-
pact on defined markets. In essence, section 7 provides for a "rule of
reason" inquiry that leaves the courts or the Federal Trade Commission
free to take into account a wide range of economically relevant con-
siderations.
Baker, S-600-An Unnecessary and Dangerous Foray Into Classic Populism, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 850 (1979) (emphasis in original).
" Compare United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal.
1976), with United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
" Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962). The Court in
Brown Shoe acknowledged that cross elasticity of production facilities may be an
important factor in defining the relevant product market. Id. at 325 n.43.
[Vol. 28:667
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be used to support the proposition that the introduction of evidence of
technological capacity is not relevant in section 7 challenges. Courts must
instead consider evidence of technological capacity on their own initiative.
The ability to employ available resources to meet changes in supply
and demand is extremely relevant to the adequate determination of the
competitive effect of the challenged acquisition. Parts III and IV of this
article will examine inconsistencies in federal court and Federal Trade
Commission decisions that have been based on a record where evidence
of increased technological capacity subsequent to the challenged acquisi-
tion was present. If the competitive effect of increased technological
capacity at either the production or distribution level was to be more
consistently considered in section 7 challenges, more mergers would be
considered horizontal mergers within the same relevant market and
section 7 of the Clayton Act could be more effective in the prohibition of
acquisitions which have the present or potential effect of lessening com-
petition. 7
III. PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY
A court's analysis of an intended acquisition challenged under section
7 of the Clayton Act evaluates both the present and potential effect on
competition that the merger may have. 8 According to the language of
section 7, the party challenging the merger must prove a change in the
structure of the market from which an inference can be drawn that com-
petition is likely to be substantially reduced sometime in the future.49 In
the determination of the effect that an acquisition may have on competi-
tion, consideration should be given to any evidence of the acquiring com-
pany's ability to affect the market structure through maximum utiliza-
tion of the combination of resources held before the merger and those
acquired in the business combination.'
Many products can be produced on the same machinery even though
they are not interchangeable in end use." A brewery, for example, is
capable of producing the related by-products of beer, including lager,
ale, porter, stout, and malt liquor.2 These related by-products are not
considered substitutes for each other in the eyes of the brewery's dis-
tinct lines of customers.' All beer drinkers will not switch to the pur-
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
4s Id.
49 .
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
' United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich.
1972).
I& at 121. The related by-products were included in the definition of the
product market even though current production did not include them.
Id at 121 n.3.
1979)
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chase of malt liquor if the supply of beer is curtailed, therefore, there is
not a high degree of cross-elasticity of demand between beer and its
related by-products.' The inability to substitute one product for another
to meet the demand within a distinct line of customers, however, does
not prevent a brewery or any other company with the equipment needed
to produce more than one product from meeting the increases in supply
or demand of a product by altering the production mix.55 A company can
thereby affect competition by switching from the production of one
product to another with little more than a few mechanical adjustments
on their existing machinery.' This ability to alter the production mix in
order to take full advantage of market conditions represents an ability
on the part of a company to employ its resources to the maximum in
order to meet demand in one of the product markets within its manufac-
turing capability.
The ability to alter a production mix may represent a substantial
threat to the competitive atmosphere of the product markets in which a
company has the resources to compete. 7 For example, a brewery with
the capability of producing malt liquor, could employ all its resources to
produce malt liquor if there is a substantial increase in demand for the
product. Even if the brewery was not engaged in the production of malt
liquor before the substantial increase in demand, it may soon gain the
position of a leader within that market because of the maximum utiliza-
tion of its resources.
Because of the opportunity to decrease competition by switching from
the production of one product to another, evidence of increased tech-
nological capacity on the production level should be given adequate con-
sideration by a court deciding a section 7 challenge.59 If there is
evidence of productive capability, the product market definition must be
developed with consideration given to that economic factor rather than
limiting the analysis of comparable products to those with a high degree
of substitutability, a distinct line of customers, or specialized vendors."
Market definition.., has been badly handled by the courts. [The
substitutability and interchangeability in end use] formulation is
" Id. See generally United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
Id
57 Id.
' Once the basic technological capacity is achieved, a production switch can
be made in a short period of time. See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F.
Supp. 637, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
" The production flexibility needs to be considered in order to determine the
merger's true impact on the markets involved. See generally Baker, supra note
43.
" United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
[Vol. 28:667
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deficient . . . [I]t ignores substitution in production. A folding
carton produced for one soap company is not interchangeable
with a folding carton produced for another company, due to dif-
ferences in the advertising copy printed on the carton and to
other minor design and production differences stemming from
the carton manufacturer's efforts to custom-design his cartons
for each user; an air-conditioner designed for a Volkswagon
"Beatle" will not fit into a Mercedes (or for that matter another
Volkswagon model); a computer terminal designed to plug into
an IBM computer won't plug into a Burroughs. Yet in all of
these examples the two products are made with the same com-
ponents, facilities, equipment, workers, etc., and an increase in
the price of one product above the competitive level would
result in a prompt switch into its production by firms producing
the other product.6
A court deciding a section 7 challenge should examine any evidence
of cross-elasticity of production to determine whether the market in
which competitive effect is measured should include the product pres-
ently or potentially manufactured by the merged and merging firm.2
After a complete analysis of the evidence of cross-elasticity of produc-
tion, the Federal Trade Commission in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp.6" ordered Kaiser to divest itself of the assets of the Lavino Divi-
sion of International Minerals & Chemical Corporation. The acquisition
of Lavino by Kaiser was found to be a section 7 violation based upon a
definition of the relevant product market which included products that
the companies had the technological ability to produce."
Both companies, Lavino and Kaiser, were involved in the production
of refractories which are used in furnaces engaged in the steelmaking
process. The various types of refractories are composed of different raw
materials and some furnaces can utilize only one type of refractory. 5
Under a product substitutability approach, the refractory market would
be divided into a number of submarkets composed of groups of refrac-
tories interchangeable in end use.66 In Kaiser, however, the Federal
6, R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 127 (1976).
62 In re Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518 (1975).
6 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
64Id
With the exception of tar bonded and tar impregnated refractories, the
open hearth, electric arc and AOD furnaces can generally utilize any of
the other basic refractories. The basic oxygen furnace uses almost exclu-
sively tar bonded or tar impregnated refractories and these refractories
have virtually no application outside the basic oxygen furnace.
Id at 834.
" Because there are numerous differing performance demands upon basic
refractories and because almost every refractory type will meet some
1979]
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Trade Commission considered the common manufacturing processes
employed in the production of refractories and the productive capability
of a firm engaged in the refractory manufacturing process."
The Kaiser product market definition included more than one type of
refractory because a company engaged in refractory production has the
equipment and technological ability necessary to produce any type of
refractory. 8 "A firm producing either basic bricks or basic specialties
[the two types of refractories] necessarily achieves the technological
capacity to produce the other product."6 Only two steps in the manufac-
turing process, the bonding process and the raw material composition,
distinguish one refractory from another. All refractories are subject to
crushing and grinding and the equipment used to produce one type of
refractory can produce the other types."
The Kaiser decision presents an excellent example of an evaluation of
all the available evidence in making a determination of the present or
potential competitive effect that an interindustry merger will have."
Even if a merger is not an intraindustry acquisition ite., an acquisition
between companies manufacturing interchangeable products, a con-
sideration should be made of the interindustry effect of a company acquir-
ing plant facilities, personnel, or basic equipment that is interchangeable
with the existing operation in producing one or more product lines."
The evaluation of anticompetitive effect on the basis of increased
technological capacity is not consistently employed when evidence simi-
lar to that present in the Kaiser action is available. For example, in FTC
particular demand better than any other refractory, there is not perfect
interchangeability and in some limited cases none at all among basic
refractories. . . .The strongest argument against including all basic
refractories in an overall basic refractory product market based on inter-
changeability of use is the fact that tar impregnated and tar bonded
refractories are used exclusively in the basic oxygen furnace and are not
employed to any significant extent in any other steelmaking process. If
interchangeability of use were the sole criterion for determining the
relevant line of commerce we would exclude these refractories.
Id. at 835-36 (emphasis in original).
67 Id. Commissioner Pitofsky, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the pro-
duction flexibility component of the product definition. He felt that even though
there was a capacity for substitutability there must be evidence of actual switch-
ing in response to changes in supply or demand before the broader definition can
be utilized. Id. at 853-54.
Id at 838.
69 Id
70 Id. at 836-37.
71 "Where the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines so must
the relevant line of commerce .. " United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441, 457 (1964).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 642 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
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v. Tenneco,3 a merger was permitted without analysis of evidence that
the acquiring firm had the technological productive capacity to manufac-
ture the products of the acquired firm. Tenneco involved an FTC
challenge of the acquisition of Monroe, a leading manufacturer and dis-
tributor of automotive shock absorbers in the United States and world-
wide, by Tenneco, Inc., a multibusiness concern. Walker, a division of
Tenneco, is a manufacturer and distributor of automotive exhaust
system parts.7 ' The court did not find a section 7 violation and held that
Walker and Monroe were not in the same line of commerce by differen-
tiating four product markets: (1) shock absorbers to the replacement
market; (2) shock absorbers to the independent aftermarket; (3) exhaust
system parts to the replacement market; and (4) exhaust system parts
to the independent aftermarket.1
5
The Tenneco record contained evidence that both shock absorbers
and exhaust system parts are manufactured in processes which use the
pipe or tube mill as the principal production unit and which employ
drawing, swedging, welding, and stamping operations in the manufac-
turing process." The fact that the products were subject to similar
manufacturing processes in Tenneco indicates that production flexibility
was a relevant economic consideration that should have been employed
in the development of the product market definition as it was in Kaiser.
If the Tenneco court had given adequate consideration to production
flexibility, there would have been a judicial examination of the similari-
ties and differences between the manufacture of shock absorbers and
exhaust system parts.77 Even though there may have been other eco-
nomic considerations present which could have diminished the probabil-
ity of a substantial lessening of competition,"8 the capability to engage in
the full scale production of a product by making minor changes to exist-
ing machinery is too great a threat to competition to disregard entirely."
433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
7 Id. at 106.
In 1976, Walker accounted for approximately 36% of shipments to the
replacement market and 39% to the independent aftermarket. Walker
also purchases shock absorbers from Monroe which it resells to its cus-
tomers. In 1976, these sales amounted to $283,000, accounting for ap-
proximately 1/10 of one percent of shipments to the shock absorber
replacement market, a market it did not enter until October, 1974.
Id at 107.
7 Id. at 113.
7 Id. at 112. There was evidence in the opinion that Walker's manufacturing
facilities "as presently constituted" could not be used for production of shock ab-
sorbers. There is no indication of the extent of mechanical adjustment needed to
produce the shock absorbers. Id.
7 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
T See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp.
1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
7" See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
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By deciding that the Tenneco acquisition would not result in a sub-
stantial lessening of competition in any of the four submarkets devel-
oped by the court in a product interchangeability analysis,0 the court
may be providing merging industries the opportunity to affect competi-
tion in all of the submarkets by alterations in the productive mix with-
out violation of section 7. An increase in the price of shock absorbers,
for example, could lead to the maximum utilization of Monroe's and
Walker's facilities to produce shock absorbers. The combination of pro-
ductive resources would give Tenneco the opportunity to drastically in-
crease the supply of shock absorbers that could previously have been
produced by Monroe. This increased productive ability will affect com-
petition by increasing the number of units previously available on the
market to meet demand. 1
While technological capacity is an important consideration, the
development of a product market definition in a section 7 challenge
should take into account all relevant economic considerations.2 Other
economic factors may decrease the probability of the acquisition, thus
lessening competition.83
In the case of Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,"
the district court engaged in a comprehensive examination of the eco-
nomic considerations relevant to a merger under a section 7 challenge in-
cluding a claim of productive technological capacity. Babock & Wilcox
Co. involved a tender offer by United Technologies, a manufacturer of
gas turbines used to generate power, for the outstanding stock of a cor-
poration which manufactures fossil fuel steam boilers and nuclear steam
systems for public utilities. Although both fossil steam and gas turbines
produce electricity, the court held that physical capability was insuffi-
cient to establish the threat of a lessening of competition because of
other economic factors:
Economic considerations raise a potent barrier to substitution of
gas turbine systems for fossil and nuclear steam systems or vice
versa. Gas turbine systems are substantially more economical to
operate for peaking purposes than either nuclear or fossil steam.
Conversely, nuclear and fossil steam are substantially more
economical to operate for cycling and baseland purposes than
gas turbine systems .... The cost disparities are so substantial
that utilities purchase gas turbine systems only for peaking pur-
poses unless there is unanticipated demand for electricity, delay
o See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
See POSNER, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See Baker, supra note 43.
See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp.
1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
4Id,
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in installation of other systems or if noneconomic considerations
exclude other systems.5
Section 7 of the Clayton Act can be a more effective means of protec-
ting and ensuring competition if the courts consistently consider the
effect that a challenged acquisition will have on competition in a signifi-
cant economic market." In determining the boundaries of this product
market, a court should consider all economically relevant factors as well
as the increase in productive technological capacity in a market made up
of two or more products with similar production requirements.17 If there
is evidence that a challenged acquisition would provide the acquiring
company with a productive technological capacity adaptable to a market
composed of products interchangeable in end use," a court should not
hesitate to consider the acquisition's effect on competition in this ex-
panded market. 9 The possibility of a substantial lessening of competition
in this broader market by a full utilization of combined productive
resources represents the monopoly in its incipiency that section 7 was
enacted to prevent.90
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY
Technological capacity, or the ability to employ available resources to
meet changes in supply and demand, can be present in either the produc-
tion or distribution level of a company's operation. Even if the products in-
volved in a section 7 challenge cannot be produced by the utilization of
identical resources, 1 the methods employed to distribute the products
to the public may be identical.2 In fact, several courts have recognized
section 7 violations on the basis of a product market definition based
upon compatibility in distribution.9
3
Id at 1267.
See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974); FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Tracindia In-
vestment Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Hughes Tool
Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
87 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976); United States v. Von's Grocery, 384
U.S. 270 (1966).
91 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764 (1979).
" A court should consider the company's distributional network and advertis-
ing program as evidence of compatibility of a firm's product line with that of the
acquired firm and its market. See Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58
B. UNIV. L. REV. 199 (1978).
"I Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d
1979]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
If a company is successful in its attempt to merge with another busi-
ness having a compatible product line in terms of distribution tech-
niques, the company could also be acquiring the opportunity to reduce
competition substantially at the present or in the future."' A similarity
in the manner in which products are advertised enables the acquiring
company to intensify concentration in one or both of the product
markets by advertising both product lines in the same slot." Similarity
in distribution techniques can also result in the creation of one distribu-
tion system for both product lines." If distributive compatibility exists,
it is also possible that the acquired and acquiring company share many
of the same customers or prospective customers.97 The products may
even be within an "array of products" that are simultaneously pur-
chased by the same purchaser."'
The Supreme Court recognized the competitive advantage that a com-
pany with compatible product lines can possess in FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co.:"
Packaged detergents- Proctor's most important product cate-
gory and household liquid bleach [the product of the acquired
company, Clorox] are used complimentarily, not only in the
washing of clothes and fabrics, but also in general household
cleaning, since liquid bleach is a germicide and disinfectant as
well as a whitener. From the consumer's viewpoint, then, pack-
aged detergents and liquid bleach are closely related products.
But the area of relatedness between products of Proctor and of
Clorox is wider. Household cleaning agents in general, like
household liquid bleach, are low-cost, high-turnover household
consumer goods marketed chiefly through grocery stores and
pre-sold to the consumer by the manufacturer through mass
advertising and sales promotions. Since products of both parties
to the merger are sold to the same customers, at the same
506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); General Foods v. FTC, 386
F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
' See United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 206 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969). "If a company that is dominant in a relatively oligopo-
listic market merges with another company as a result of which the dominant
company gains marketing and promotional competitive advantages . . . the
merger violates [§ 7 of the Clayton Act] proscribing mergers with anticompeti-
tive effect." Id. at 767.
9' See, e.g., General Foods v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
See, e.g., FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
97 Id
" See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 642 (C.D. Cal.
1976). The "cluster of products" concept was first utilized in United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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stores, and by the same merchandising methods, the possibility
arises of significant integration at both the marketing and dis-
tribution levels.1"'
The Brown Shoe court did not disregard product compatibility in dis-
tribution as an economic consideration in determining the competitive
effect of a merger. It developed the product market definition on the
basis of evidence in the record which did not substantially show that the
products involved could be sold to the same customers or through simi-
lar distribution channels."'O Brown Shoe's direct substitutability criteria
must therefore be supplemented by an analysis of interchangeability in
distribution where there is evidence in the record of product compati-
bility. A merger which results in the acquiring company using its preex-
isting channels of distribution to market both product lines can lead to a
substantial lessening of competition through the employment of two dis-
tribution systems, those of the acquiring and acquired company, to
market a product distributed by smaller competitors through a single
distribution system. Through maximum utilization of the combination of
resources held before the merger and those acquired in the business
combination, the surviving company has gained the ability to increase
consumer awareness of its products through advertising or to increase
distribution to areas with a large consumer demand. Thus, there is the
possibility of a lessening of competition if other firms in the industry do
not have the resources to effectively compete with the larger firm's in-
creased distributive technological capacity.'
The degree of compatibility in distribution which will be sanctioned
by Section 7 will depend upon the presence of other relevant economic
considerations1 0 3 and on the characteristics of the target market.' 4
United States v. Hughes Tool Co.,"' a recent California case, presents
some excellent guidelines for the development of a product market
through an analysis of the "complementarity and integration linking the
products."'"'
The Hughes litigation was prompted by Hughes' attempt to merge
with Byron Jackson, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Borg-Warner Cor-
poration. Hughes was primarily engaged in the development, manufac-
100 Id at 573-74.
"' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
"' See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
"" In addition to productive technological capacity, these considerations in-
clude "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic en-
tity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes and specialized
vendors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 297, 325 (1962).
104 Bauer, supra note 92, at 208.
'0' 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
0' Id. at 641. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
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ture, and sale of rotary bits used in drilling oil and gas wells."7 Byron
Jackson was primarily a well-servicing company which included in its
operation a machinery division that manufactured and sold certain drill-
ing equipment used on oil and gas drilling rigs."' In rejecting the
government's contention that the relevant product market contained
submarkets of sixteen individual tools and two combinations thereof,
the court defined the relevant product market in terms that considered
the relationship between the products:
[T]he defendant's product market, consisting of a cluster of
specialized surface rotary drilling tools, is the relevant product
market. There exists a high degree of functional complemen-
tarity and integration linking the products. There is a high
degree of commonality in the technology and manufacturing pro-
cesses involving the components of the market. All products are
marketed through similar channels and to the same group of
buyers. 10
According to Hughes, therefore, products are functional equivalents if
they are purchased by the same group of buyers through similar, if not
identical, distribution channels.11 In FTC v. Tenneco,"' the court permit-
ted a merger between an exhaust system and shock absorber manufac-
turer. The evidence showing functional complementarity between the
products did not appear to enter into the court's determination of the
relevant market in which to judge competitive effect; the market was
found to be composed of four submarkets comprised of products inter-
changeable in end use."2
If the functional "complementarity and integration linking the prod-
ucts" involved had been considered, the Tenneco acquisition may have
been prohibited as a change in the structure of the market from which
an inference could be drawn that competition was likely to be substan-
tially reduced sometime in the future."3 Evidence of a change in the
structure of the market was introduced to show that the markets for
shock absorbers and exhaust system parts were compatible due to simi-
larities in marketing channels and manufacturing techniques. The acqui-
sition of Monroe gave Tenneco the ability to create a single distribution
"1d at 638.
108 Id
" Id at 641. The Hughes court found for the defendant because the govern-
ment failed to carry the burden of proof to provide sufficient evidence that the
merger would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
110 Id
". 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977). This case also involved evidence of increased
technological capacity. See notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text.
Id. at 112.
"1 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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system for shock absorbers and exhaust system parts.11 ' If the court had
analyzed the evidence of product compatibility, the court would have
considered the change in the structure of the market presented by the
Tenneco acquisition and would have determined whether the change
was sufficient to show a substantial reduction of competition at the
present or in the future.
If a court does not consider evidence in the record of functional equiv-
alency, it seems that it does not evaluate the true effect on competition
that a challenged acquisition presents.115 A court basing its product
market definition on the interchangeability of the end use of the prod-
ucts involved is presenting a company who gains increased distributive
capacity with an opportunity to substantially lessen competition in one
or more product lines without violating section 7.2" The change in the
market structure composed of the relevant products must be evaluated
to determine if there is a likelihood of reduced competition.
V. CONCLUSION
An incomplete analysis of the competitive effect of a section 7 chal-
lenged acquisition may allow a merger which results in the acquiring
corporation gaining the ability to substantially lessen competition at
some future point in time. The court's definition of the product market
in a section 7 challenge should not be based on the same criteria as that
used to construct a market in other judicial opinions if there is addi-
tional evidence of competitive effect present in the record.
If the record includes evidence of increased technological capacity,
that evidence must be considered in determining the competitive effect
of the acquisition. Technological capacity will not be the only economic
consideration, of course, but it is one which must be weighed against
other considerations in determining the acquisition's effect on competi-
tion. It is an underutilization of section 7 to define a product market
merely in terms of a product's interchangeability of end use without
analysis of evidence of increased technological capacity. Such an under-
utilization undermines the protection of competition symbolized in the
nation's antitrust laws.
CAROL SZCZEPANIK
114 Walker had been contemplating the creation of a single distribution system
for both shock absorbers and exhaust system parts prior to the acquisition. FTC
v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 112 (D.D.C. 1977).
15 See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Foods, 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1978). This case involved the acquisition by Consolidated Foods Corporation, a
large conglomerate-the 78th largest company in the Fortune 500-of Chef
Pierre, a company engaged in the production and sale of both retail and institu-
tional frozen dessert pies. The acquisition was allowed after the court found two
submarkets, retail and institutional dessert pies.
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